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a b s t r a c t
In [R.J. Corin, J.I. den Hartog, A probabilistic hoare-style logic for game-based cryptographic
proofs, in: M. Bugliesi, B. Preneel, V. Sassone (Eds.), ICALP 2006 Track C, Venice,
Italy, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4052, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2006,
pp. 252–263] we build a formal verification technique for game-based correctness proofs
of cryptographic algorithms based on a probabilistic Hoare style logic [J.I. den Hartog,
E.P. de Vink, Verifying probabilistic programs using a Hoare like logic, International Journal
of Foundations of Computer Science 13 (3) (2002) 315–340]. An important step towards
enablingmechanized verificationwithin this technique is an axiomatization of implication
betweenpredicateswhich is purely semantically defined in the latter reference cited above.
In this paper we provide an axiomatization and illustrate its place in the formal verification
technique given in the former.
© 2008 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
A typical proof to show that a cryptographic construction is secure uses a reduction from the desired security notion
towards some underlying hardness assumption. The security notion is usually represented as a game, in which one proves
that the attacker’s chance of winning the game is negligible. From a programming language perspective, these games can be
thought of as programswhose behaviour is partially known, since the program typically contains invocations to an unknown
function, i.e. a function for which the body is not fixed, representing an arbitrary attacker. In this context, the cryptographic
reduction is a sequence of valid program transformations.
Even though cryptographic proofs based on game reductions are powerful, the price one has to pay is high: these proofs
are complex, and can easily become involved and intricate. This makes the verification difficult, with subtle errors difficult
to spot. Some errors may remain uncovered long after publication, as illustrated for example by Boneh and Franklin’s IBE
encryption scheme [3], whose cryptographic proof has been recently patched by Galindo [7].
Recently, several papers from the cryptographic community (e.g. the work of Bellare and Rogaway [1], Halevi [8], and
Shoup [13]) have recognized the need to tame the complexity of cryptographic proofs. There, the need for (development
of) rigorous tools to organize cryptographic proofs in a systematic way is advocated. Besides preventing subtle easily
overlookedmistakes from being introduced in the proof, this precise proof development framework would also standardize
the proof writing language so that proofs can be checked easily, even perhaps using computer aided verification. The
proposed frameworks [1,8,13] provide ad hoc formalisms to reason about the sequences of games, providing useful program
transformation rules and illustrating the techniques with several cryptographic proofs from the literature.
In [5] we introduce a framework for game-based cryptographic proofs based on Hoare logic [10] by adapting and
extending earlier work on Probabilistic Hoare logic [9]. The use of the framework is illustrated with a formalized proof
of security of ElGamal [6], which reduces the semantic security of the cryptosystem to the hardness of solving the (well-
known)Decisional Diffie–Hellmanproblem [2]. An approach [11] similar to ours introduces two systemswhich, translated to
our approach, reason about probabilistic predicates (though restricted to counting) and about indistinguishability of Hoare
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triples respectively.Main differences are that, on theHoare triple levelwe only cover equivalence not yet indistinguishability
while, on the other hand, our approach covers the step from program to mathematical function and combines the two
systems using the well established approach of Hoare logic. For both approaches mechanization is still an open issue.
Here we address an important step towards the mechanization of proofs in the framework of [5]: axiomatization of
the implication relation between predicates. The Hoare rules allow reasoning about programs, however, this needs to be
combined with a system for reasoning about the probabilistic predicates used to express pre and postconditions. The main
result of this paper is to provide this reasoning system in the form of a calculus for implication and equivalence of predicates.
The core of the calculus, besides a conservative extension result allowing classical logical reasoning, is formed by a list of
axioms and a congruence result enabling equational reasoning. Hence we also refer to the calculus as an axiomatization of
the probabilistic predicate logic.
2. The basics
We shortly recall the predicates used by the probabilistic Hoare style logic pL [9]. We introduce probabilistic states Θ
and the validity relation |H for predicates which asserts that a predicate holds in a given probabilistic state.
Expressions. We define integer expressions e and Boolean expressions (or ‘conditions’) c by:
e ::= n | x | e + e | e − e | e · e | e div e | e mod e | f (e, . . . , e)
c ::= true | false | b | e = e | e < e | c ∧ c | c ∨ c | ¬c | c→ c
with x is a variable of type integer, b a variable of type Boolean, n an integer and f a function symbol. We assume it is clear
how this can be extended with additional operators and to other types and mostly leave the types of variables implicit,
assuming that all variables and values are of the correct type.
Programs. Probabilistic program statements s are defined by:
s ::= skip | x := e | s ; s | if c then s else s fi | D(e, . . . , e; x, . . . , x) | s⊕ρ s
where x is a program variable, e an expression of the right type, ρ is a number in [0, 1], ; denotes sequential composition,
if conditional choice, D a procedure call and ⊕ρ probabilistic choice. The procedure call D(e, e′; x, y) causes the body BD
of D to be executed with e, e′ as read only and x, y as read–write arguments. The read–write arguments must be distinct
variables (i.e. no aliasing). In s ⊕ρ s′ program s is executed with probability ρ and s′ is executed with probability 1 − ρ.
Formally a program is a pair (s, B) consisting of a program statement and the declaration giving the procedure bodies and
the interpretation of function symbols. We will assume that the intended declaration is clear from the context and not
distinguish between programs and statements.
States. A deterministic state, σ ∈ S, is a function that assigns a value to each program variable. A probabilistic state, θ ∈ Θ
gives the probability of being in a given deterministic state.We represent a probabilistic state by a sum ρ1 ·σ1+ρ2 ·σ2+· · ·.
Here, the probability of being in the (deterministic) state σi is ρi, i ≥ 0. Equivalently we can also think of a probabilistic state
as a function from deterministic states to [0, 1] with countable support. The sum of all probabilities σi is at most 1, with a
sum less than 1 indicating a state with ‘incomplete information’ (e.g. caused by non-termination).Without loss of generality
we assume that each state σ occurs at most once in θ ; multiple occurrences of a single state can be merged into one single
occurrence by adding the probabilities, e.g. 1 · σ rather than 34 · σ + 14 · σ .
Operations on states. The valueV(e)(σ ) of an expression e in a state σ is defined as usual. A variant σ [x/e] of a deterministic
state σ is a state which only differs from σ for the variable xwhere it returns V(e)(σ ) the value of expression e (in state σ ).
A variant θ [x/e] of a probabilistic state θ is obtained by taking the variant elementwise, i.e. if θ = ρ1 ·σ1+ρ2 ·σ2+· · · then
θ [x/e] = ρ1 · σ1[x/e] + ρ2 · σ2[x/e] + · · ·. The partial operations + (addition), ρ· (scaling) on probabilistic states are the
addition and scaling of functions. (Recall that states can be seen as functions to [0, 1].) These functions are partial as they
only yield probabilistic states when the sum over all elements, i.e. the total probability does not exceed 1. The operation⊕ρ
(probabilistic choice) combines addition and scaling: θ ⊕ρ θ ′ = ρ · θ + (1 − ρ) · θ ′. Finally the operation c? (conditional
choice) removes the probability for states which do not satisfy c: if θ = ρ1 · σ1 + ρ2 · σ2 + · · · and c is true in σ1, σ3 but not
in σ2, etc. then c?θ = ρ1 · σ1 + ρ3 · σ3 + · · ·.
Deterministic and probabilistic predicates. Deterministic predicates dp ∈ DPred are first order predicate logical formulas, i.e.
dp ::=true |false |b | e ≤ e | dp ∧ dp | dp ∨ dp | ¬ dp | dp→ dp | ∃i :dp | ∀i :dp.
Note that the conditions (Boolean expression) are also deterministic predicates. With interpretation, e.g. I , to give the value
of the (program and logical, non-program) variables we can check if a predicate is satisfied, denoted I |Hd dp. If we have
a distribution instead of the value of program variables, e.g. in a probabilistic state, we get a probability that the predicate
holds. We useP(dp) to denote this probability and around it build new types of expressions, the probabilistic expressions (o),
with range [0, 1]:
o ::= ρ | r | P(dp) | o+ o | o− o | o ∗ o | o/o
where ρ is a number in [0, 1] and r a variable over this domain. A probabilistic state provides the distribution of the program
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variables with which we evaluate P(dp). For logical variables such as rwe still have a standard interpretation which simply
provides the value (i.e. a number in [0, 1]).
Example 2.1. The expression r + P(x > 2) has value 34 for interpretation I with I(r) = 14 and state 14 · [x = 1] + 14 · [x =
2] + 14 · [x = 3] + 14 · [x = 4]. Note that in the representation of a deterministic state we restrict to giving the values for
relevant variables only.
1
2 · x is not a valid expression as program variables are allowed only within in the P(·) construct.
Probabilistic predicates p, q ∈ Pred are basically first order predicate formulas and the combination of such predicates
using (logical and arithmetical) operators:
p ::= true | false | b | e ≤ e | p ∧ p | p ∨ p | ¬p | p→ p | ∃j : p | ∀j : p | ρ · p | p+ p | p⊕ρ p | c?p.
Note that the type of the expression e can be any of the types introduced, including the probabilistic expressions.
Example 2.2. A common basic predicate P(x = 1) = r states that probability of a deterministic predicate, in this case
x = 1, holding is equal to r.
The predicate ∀i, j : P(x = i ∧ y = j) = P(x = i) · P(y = j) states that x and y are independent.
Given a probabilistic state and an interpretation of the logical variables we can check if the state satisfies a predicate,
(θ, I) |H p, or simply θ |H p, again omitting the interpretation I from the notation. The interpretation of comparison
of expressions and the logic operators is standard. The arithmetical operators are the logical counterparts of the same
operations on states. We have:
θ |H ρ · p when there exists θ ′: θ = ρ · θ ′, θ |H p
θ |H p+ p′ when there exists θ1, θ2: θ = θ1 + θ2, θ1 |H p and θ2 |H p′
θ |H p⊕ρ p′ when there exists θ1, θ2: θ = θ1 ⊕ρ θ2, θ1 |H p and θ2 |H p′
θ |H c?p when there exists θ ′: θ = c?θ ′, θ |H p.
If a predicate does not use the P(·) function nor the arithmetical operators, we do not need the probabilistic state to check
if the predicate is satisfied (only the interpretation of the logical variables is needed). We call such predicates P-free.
Example 2.3. The predicate (P(x = 1) = 14 )+(P(x>2) = r) is true in state 14 ·[x = 1]+ 14 ·[x = 2]+ 14 ·[x = 3]+ 14 ·[x = 4]
with interpretation I , I(r) = 34 , because we can split the state into 14 · [x = 1], which satisfies P(x = 1) = 14 , and
1
4 · [x = 2] + 14 · [x = 3] + 14 · [x = 4]which satisfies P(x> 2) = r.
Predicate (P(x = 1) = 14 )+ (P(x<3) = r) is false in this state and I; there is no way of splitting the state in such a way
that parts satisfy both predicates.
3. A probabilistic Hoare style logic
In this section we briefly introduce the probabilistic Hoare style logic. See [9,5] for details. Hoare triples, also known
as program correctness triples, give a precondition and a postcondition for a program. A triple is said to be valid, denoted
|H { p } s { q } , if the precondition guarantees the postcondition after execution of the program.
Our derivation system for Hoare triples adapts and extends the existing Hoare logic calculus. The rules for skip,
assignment, sequential composition, precondition strengthening and postcondition weakening and procedure calls are
standard. The rule for conditional choice is adjusted and a new rule for probabilistic choice is added, along with some
structural rules. We only present the main rules here (see e.g. [9] for a complete overview), noting that the other rules
come directly from Hoare logic or from natural deduction.
{ p[x/e] } x := e { p }
(Assign)
{ c?p } s { q } { ¬c?p } s′ { q′ }
{ p } if c then s else s′ fi { q+ q′ }
(If)
{ p } s { p′ } { p′ } s′ { q }
{ p } s ; s′ { q }
(Seq)
{ p } s { q } { p } s′ { q′ }
{ p } s⊕ρ s′ { q⊕ρ q′ }
(Prob)
{ p } s { q } { p } s { q′ }
{ p } s { q ∧ q′ }
(And)
p′ ⇒ p { p } s { q } q⇒ q′
{ p′ } s { q′ }
(Cons)
{ p } BD { q }
{ p[e1,...,en,x1,...,xn / v1,...,vn,w1,...,wm ] } D(e1, . . . , en; x1, . . . , xn) { q[x1,...,xn / w1,...,wm ] }
(Proc)
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Note the use of the implication operation⇒ in the (Cons) rule. This operation is formally defined in the next section
which also discusses the axiomatization of this operation. After treating reasoning about (implication between) probabilistic
predicates in the next section we apply the Hoare rules in the example derivation in Section 5.
4. A calculus for probabilistic predicates
The important ‘rule of consequence’ (Cons) in the Hoare style logic allows strengthening of the precondition and
weakening of the postcondition. To apply this rule we need to determine which implications are valid. In this section we
provide results allowing reasoning about equivalence of predicates and the implication between predicates. These results
consist of a conservative extension result, allowing the use of standard first order reasoning methods, a congruence result
allowing equational reasoning and a list of equivalences capturing the arithmetical operators, usable as axioms in the
equational reasoning.
The key relation in our ‘calculus’ is equivalence≡ of predicates.
Definition 4.1. We write p⇒ p′ when for all θ, I if (θ, I) |H p then (θ, I) |H p′ and write p ≡ p′ if p⇒ p′ and p′ ⇒ p.
The calculus is soundwith respect to this semantics of⇒. A sketch of the proof is provided in the Appendix and it contains
a more formal description of the equational reasoning in the calculus. Other issues such as completeness and decidability
are discussed in Section 6. We first present the congruence results for⇒.
Lemma 4.2 (Congruence). If p⇒ p′ then op p⇒ op p′ for op ∈ { ∃i :,∀i :, ρ·, c? } and¬ p′ ⇒ ¬ p.
If p⇒ p′ and q⇒ q′ then p op q⇒ p′ op q′ for op ∈ {∧,∨,+,⊕ρ } and p′ → q⇒ p→ q′.
As a direct consequence we also have that≡ is a congruence for all operators.
4.1. Non-probabilistic reasoning
The interpretation of the logical constructions is standard. If we consider the probabilistic and arithmetical constructions
to be ‘black boxes’ we can do classical reasoning. To be more precise, for a fixed state θ the construct P() is just another
function symbol in the probabilistic (i.e. real valued) expressions. When reasoning non-probabilistically we ignore the state
θ . Thus the exact function represented by P() is not known, only that it is some function to [0, 1]. Similarly any arithmetical
construct, e.g. p+ q, can be seen as a black box, i.e. an unknown function which describes a Boolean.
Definition 4.3. Weuse dp〈〉 to denote the context inwhich the logical variables i1, . . . , in occurring in dp have been replaced
by open places (denoted unionsq1, . . . ,unionsqn) and dp〈j1, . . . , jn〉 for the predicate obtained by substituting j1, . . . , jn in the open
places. We introduce a fresh n-ary function symbol rdp〈〉 to denote an unknown function to [0, 1]. Similarly, p〈〉 denotes the
context obtained from p and bp〈〉 a fresh Boolean function symbol.
Using the function symbols above we define ‘black box interpretations’ for expressions and probabilistic predicates.
We obtain expression BB(e) from expression e by replacing each occurrence of P(dp) by the corresponding function
rdp〈〉(i1, . . . , in). A black box interpretation BB(p) of a probabilistic predicate p is a deterministic predicate satisfying:
BB(p) = bp〈〉 or
BB(p) = p for p P-free, or
BB(p) = BB(e) ≤ BB(e′) for p = e ≤ e′, or
BB(p) = BB(q) op BB(q′) for p = q op q′, op ∈ {∧,∨,→ }, or
BB(p) = op BB(q) for p = op q, op ∈ { ∀i, ∃i,¬ }.
The definition of a black box interpretation of a predicate has been chosen to allow reasoning about the predicatewithout
needing to take into account its probabilistic aspects. The next lemma makes this more precise. Note that we say a rather
than the black box interpretation. We can choose how much of the structure of a predicate is ‘put in the black box’. For
example, both bp∧q〈〉 and bp〈〉 ∧ bq〈〉 are black box interpretations of p ∧ q.
Lemma 4.4. If I |Hd BB(p) then for any θ we have (I, θ) |H p.
If |Hd BB(p)→ BB(q) then p⇒ q.
If |Hd BB(p)↔ BB(q) then p ≡ q.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: The validity of BB(p) is obtained irrespective of the value given by the
functions rdp() and bp(). By fixing θ we only select one possible function for which the predicate is true.
Example 4.5. (i) i = j ⇒ P(x = i) = P(x = j) can be derived by noting: BB(P(x = i) = P(x = j)) = (rx=unionsq(i) = rx=unionsq(j))
and |Hd (i = j)→ (rx=unionsq(i) = rx=unionsq(j)).
(ii) p+ q ∧ p+ q ≡ p+ q can be derived by noting: BB(p+ q ∧ p+ q) = BB(p+ q) ∧ BB(p+ q) = bp+q〈〉() ∧ bp+q〈〉()
and |Hd bp+q〈〉() ∧ bp+q〈〉()↔ bp+q〈〉()
(iii) We cannot derive (p∧ p) + q ≡ p+ q directly using Lemma 4.4 as we cannot ‘look into’ the black box (p∧ p) + q.
However, we can first note that p ∧ p ≡ p and then apply the congruence result.
Thus the non-probabilistic part of the reasoning is standard. We assume the reader is familiar with ways of formalizing
such reasoning and we will be less precise in this part of the reasoning.
56 J. den Hartog / Science of Computer Programming 74 (2008) 52–63
4.2. The axioms
To deal with the arithmetical operators we provide a list of equivalences that can be used as an axiomatic basis of
equational reasoning. The equivalences provide basic properties and distributivity laws for each of the operators. We do
not treat the operator⊕ρ as p⊕ρ p′ is equivalent to ρ · p+ (1− ρ) · p′.
In the axioms we will want to state things about validity of deterministic predicates (e.g. dp → dp′). However,
deterministic predicate may contain program variables which are not allowed in probabilistic predicates (outside of a
P() construction). In this case by validity we mean that the deterministic predicate must hold, no matter which value the
program variables have. We introduce the new notation (dp) capturing this notion of validity.
Definition 4.6. Let x1, . . . xn be the program variables occurring in dp and let j1, . . . jn be fresh logical variables (i.e. not
occurring in dp). Then
(dp) ::= ∀j1, . . . jn : dp[j1/x1, . . . jm/xm].
Note that (dp) is a P-free predicate which holds exactly when dp is fulfilled by every deterministic state, i.e. (θ, I) |H
(dp) iff ∀σ : (σ , I) |Hd dp.
Probabilistic axioms
The following axioms capture basic properties of probabilistic states.
P(false) = 0 ≡ true (A1)
P(true) ≤ 1 ≡ true (A2)
P(dp ∨ dp′) = P(dp)+ P(dp′)− P(dp ∧ dp′) ≡ true (A3)
(dp→ dp′) ⇒ P(dp) ≤ P(dp′). (A4)
The first three axioms state that the given equations on chances are tautologies. They follow directly from the properties
of (sub-)probability measures. Recall that incomplete states (e.g. caused by non-termination) may satisfy P(true) < 1. The
last axiom lifts reasoning on deterministic predicates to probabilistic predicates: If dp→ dp′must hold then the probability
P(dp) of dp cannot be more than the probability P(dp′) of dp′. (Note that any axiom of the form p ⇒ q could equivalently
be written as p ≡ p ∧ q thus still fits within the equational system.)
Example 4.7. (i) We obtain
(dp↔ dp′) ⇒ P(dp) = P(dp′)
directly from (A4).
(ii) We have
P(dp) = P(true)− P(¬dp) ≡ true.
In the derivation we streamline the notation slightly, writing o1 = o2 = . . . = on rather than true ≡ (o1 = o2) ≡ . . . ≡
(o1 = o2) ∧ . . . ∧ (on−1 = on) ≡ (o1 = on). Using this notation gives
P(dp′) [(A3)] = P(dp ∧ ¬dp′)+ P(dp ∨ ¬dp)− P(¬dp)
[ex. 4.7(i)] = P(false)+ P(true)− P(¬dp)
[(A1)] = 0+ P(true)− P(¬dp)
= P(true)− P(¬dp).
Axioms for ·
The following two sets of axioms capture the behaviour of the ‘·’ operator. We first present basic axioms followed by
distributivity laws.
ρ · (P(dp) = r) ≡ P(dp) = ρ · r ∧ P(true) ≤ ρ (A5)
ρ · (ρ ′ · p) ≡ (ρ · ρ ′) · p (A6)
ρ · p ≡ p ∧ P(true) ≤ ρ if p is P-free. (A7)
Axiom (A5) characterizes the · operator: The probability of all events is scaled. The probability of the event dp becomes
ρ · r and no event can have a probability greater than ρ · 1 does to the scaling. The second axiom states that first scaling
with ρ ′ and then with ρ is the same as scaling directly with ρ ·ρ ′. As aP-free predicate does not depend on the probabilistic
state, it is not influenced by scaling of this state. The scaling only affects the total probability (P(true)) that the state can
have; after scaling it can be at most ρ.
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Example 4.8. (i) We have commutativity for ·:
ρ · (ρ ′ · p) [(A6)] ≡ (ρ · ρ ′) · p ≡ (ρ ′ · ρ) · p [(A6)] ≡ ρ ′ · (ρ · p).
(ii) Applying · influences the state but not the logical variables:
1
2 · (P(x = 1) = 12 ) ⇒ P(x = 1) = 14
1
2 · (r = 12 ) ⇒ r = 12
1
2 · (P(x = 1) = r ∧ r = 12 ) ⇒ P(x = 1) = 12 r ∧ r = 12 ⇒ P(x = 1) = 14 .
The next set of axioms capture the interplay between · and the other operators in a number of distributivity laws. The
operator · distributes over the other operators in a straightforward manner. Only for + there is a complication which is
explained below the rules.
ρ · (p op p′) ≡ (ρ · p) op (ρ · p′) (A8)
ρ · (op’ p) ≡ op’(ρ · p′) (A9)
ρ · (p+ q) ≡ ∃r : ρ · (p ∧ P(true) ≤ r)+ ρ · (q ∧ P(true) ≤ 1− r) (A10)
with op ∈ {∧,∨,⊕ρ′}, op’ ∈ {∃i :,∀i :, ρ ′·, c?} and r a fresh variable not occurring in p or q. The scaling operator · distributes
straightforwardly over all other operators except+ for which there is a complication: If θ satisfies p and θ ′ satisfies p′ and
θ + θ ′ is a probabilistic state then this state satisfies p + p′. However, θ + θ ′ may have a total mass greater than 1. In this
case first adding and then scaling, as in e.g. 12 · (p+ q) is not possible, however, if the states are first scaled then they can be
added, as in 12 · p + 12 · q, without exceeding the maximum total probability of 1. Axiom (A10) captures the property that
ρ · (p+ q) is the same as ρ · p+ ρ · q as long as the total probability of 1 is not exceeded. Note that as a direct consequence
of this rule we have ρ · (p+ q) ⇒ ρ · p+ ρ · q.
Axioms for ?
In giving the characterization of the ? operator we have the complication that part of the state has been removed. The
probability of events will depend on the part of the state that has been removed.
c?(P(dp) = r) ≡ P(¬c) = 0 ∧ ∃rδ : P(dp) = r − rδ ∧
0 ≤ rδ ≤ 1− P(true) ∧ (dp→ c)→ rδ = 0 (A11)
c?(c′?p) ≡ (c ∧ c′)?p (A12)
c?p ≡ p ∧ P(¬c) = 0 if p is P-free (A13)
true?p ≡ p (A14)
(c↔ c′) ∧ c?p ⇒ c′?p. (A15)
By removing the part of the statewhere c does not hold, the chance of¬c becomes 0 and the probability of dp is decreased
by some amount rδ . Clearly rδ is at most 1−P(true)which is the total amount of probability that is missing. If dp logically
implies c the probability of dp cannot be decreased by removing states not satisfying c, so rδ must be 0. (Also, if dp implies
¬c then all states satisfying dp will be removed giving rδ = r but this is already implied by the fact that P(¬c) = 0.) The
other axioms are relatively straightforward.
Example 4.9. (i) The total probability of c?p is the probability of c in p.
c?(P(c) = r) [(A11)] ⇒ P(¬c) = 0 ∧ ∃rδ : P(c) = r − rδ ∧ rδ = 0
⇒ P(¬c) = 0 ∧ P(c) = r
[(A3)] ⇒ P(c ∨ ¬c) = 0+ r + 0
⇒ P(true) = r.
(ii) Similarly, if c is implied by dp then the probability of dpwill not change by applying c?.
(dp→ c) ∧ c?(P(dp) = r) [(A11)] ⇒ ∃rδ : P(dp) = r − rδ ∧ rδ = 0 ⇒ P(dp) = r.
The next set of axioms provides distributivity laws for ?.
c?(p ∨ q) ≡ (c?p) ∨ (c?q) (A16)
c?(∃i : p) ≡ ∃i : (c?p) (A17)
c?(p+ q) ≡ ∃r : c?(p ∧ P(true) ≤ r)+ c?(q ∧ P(true) ≤ 1− r) (A18)
with i not free in c and r a fresh variable not occurring in p or q. With distributivity over+we have a similar situation as for
·; c?(p+ q) is the same as c?p+ c?q as long as the total probability of 1 is not exceeded. The operator ? does not distribute
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over ∧ (nor over ∀i :), c?p ∧ q 6≡ c?p ∧ c?q, as p and qmay have conflicting requirements for the part of the state which is
removed by first applying the c? operator. We have to suffice with implication and a special case:
c?(∀i : p) ⇒ ∀i : c?p (A19)
c?(p ∧ q) ⇒ c?p ∧ c?q (A20)
c?(p ∧ q) ≡ c?p ∧ c?q if p is P-free. (A21)
For a P-free predicate the equivalence does hold as a P-free predicate is not influenced by the ? operator. Note that a
similar ‘P-free-axiom’ for ∀ already follows using (A13).
Axioms for+
The following two sets of axioms capture the behaviour of the + operator. We first present basic axioms followed by
distributivity laws.
P(dp) = r + P(dp′) = r ′ ≡ r ≤ P(dp) ∧ r ′ ≤ P(dp′) ∧ P(dp ∧ dp′) ≤ r + r ′ ≤ P(dp ∨ dp′) (A22)
p+ q ≡ q+ p (A23)
(p1 + p2)+ p3 ≡ p1 + (p2 + p3) (A24)
p+ p′ ≡ p ∧ (true+ p′) if p is P-free. (A25)
The first rule provides a characterization of the+ operator: Two partial states are combined. The probability of an event
cannot be less in the combined state than it already is in one of the two parts. The probability of the event dp ∧ dp′ is at most
r + r ′ because its probability is at most r in the left-hand part and at most r ′ in the right-hand part. Similarly the probability
of dp ∨ dp′ is at least r+ r ′ because its probability is at least r and r ′ in the respective parts. The second rule (commutativity)
and third rule (associativity) are standard while the last rule allows moving ‘non-probabilistic’ properties to outside the+.
Example 4.10. Taking dp′ equal to dp in the first rule gives
P(dp) = r + P(dp) = r ′
[(A22)] ≡ r ≤ P(dp) ∧ r ′ ≤ P(dp) ∧ P(dp ∧ dp) ≤ r + r ′ ≤ P(dp ∨ dp)
[(A4)] ≡ r ≤ P(dp) ∧ r ′ ≤ P(dp) ∧ P(dp) ≤ r + r ′ ≤ P(dp)
[r, r ′ ≥ 0] ≡ P(dp) = r + r ′.
(Note that the remark [r, r ′ ≥ 0] in the last equivalence is needed only for the reverse implication.)
Finally, we provide a set of distributivity laws for+which are similar to those for c?:
(p ∨ p′)+ q ≡ (p+ q) ∨ (p′ + q) (A26)
(∃i : p)+ q ≡ ∃i : (p+ q) i not free in q (A27)
(∀i : p)+ q ⇒ ∀i : (p+ q) if i not free in q (A28)
(p ∧ p′)+ q ⇒ (p+ q) ∧ (p′ + q) (A29)
(p ∧ p′)+ q ≡ (p+ q) ∧ (p′ + q) if p is P-free. (A30)
This completes the axiom system. In the next section we illustrate the calculus by axiomatizing the main Hoare logic
derivation from the verification of ElGamal presented in [5].
5. Applying the calculus in the ElGamal proof
In this section we show how the calculus can be applied by treating a derivation from [5]. The proof outline in Table 1
represents this derivationwhich shows that the program, a transformed security game, is similar to a coin toss. The complete
proof of ElGamal security uses several transformations to reach this game. We first recall some short-hand notation and
results from [5].
Definition 5.1. We use I(e, e′) to denote that expressions e and e′ are independent:
I(e, e′) ::= ∀i, j : P(e = i ∧ e′ = j) = P(e = i) · P(e′ = j).
We use RS,S′(e, e′) to denote that expressions e, e′ have independent uniform distributions over their respective domains
S, S ′:
RS,S′(e, e′) ::= ∀i, j : P(e = i ∧ e′ = j) = 1/|S| · 1/|S ′|.
We assume it is clear how this can be extended to any number of expressions.
As a basic result we have that ‘independent uniform distributed’ variables are exactly that, independent and uniformly
distributed. Also we have that if an expression is independent of the arguments of a function then it is independent of the
outcome.
J. den Hartog / Science of Computer Programming 74 (2008) 52–63 59
Table 1
Derivation of {RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)} s {P(x1) = 1/2}
{RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)}
(I1)⇒ (A)
{RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · A0(v1, v4), v4, v5) ∧ RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · A1(v1, v4), v4, v5)}
m0 := A0(v1, v4); (1)
m1 := A1(v1, v4); (2)
p0
4= {RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · m0, v4, v5) ∧ RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · m1, v4, v5)}
if v5 = false then (3)
{(¬v5)?p0} (I2)⇒ {(¬v5)?RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · m0, v4, v5)}
tmp := v3 ·m0 (3a)
p1
4= {(¬v5)?RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, tmp, v4, v5)}
else
{(v5)?p0} (I3)⇒ {(v5)?RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · m1, v4, v5)}
tmp := v3 ·m1 (3b)
p2
4= {(v5)?RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, tmp, v4, v5)}
fi
{p1+ p2} (I4)⇒ {RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, tmp, v4, v5)}
(I5)⇒
{RBool(v5) ∧ I(v5, A2(v1, v2, tmp, v4))}
b := A2(v1, v2, tmp, v4) (4)
{RBool(v5) ∧ I(v5, b)} (I6)⇒ {P(v5 = b) = 1/2}
if v5 = b then (5)
{(v5 = b)?(P(v5 = b) = 1/2)} (I7)⇒ {P(true) = 1/2}
x1 := true (5a)
{P(x1) = 1/2}
else
{(v5 6= b)?(P(v5 = b) = 1/2)} (I8)⇒ {P(false) = 0}
x1 := false (5b)
{P(x1) = 0}
fi
{(P(x1) = 1/2)+ (P(x1) = 0)} (I9)⇒
{P(x1) = 1/2} (B)
Lemma 5.2.
RS,S′(e, e′) ≡ RS(e) ∧ RS′(e′) ∧ I(e, e′)
I(e, e′) ⇒ I(e, f (e′)).
The transformed security game is the program s given by the numbered lines in Table 1. For this program we derive
{RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)} s {P(x1) = 1/2}.
In other words, we show that given random inputs the chance of the event x1, which represents correctly guessing which
message was encoded (m0 orm1), is equal to half.
We describe how to derive the Hoare triple in Table 1, in bottom up fashion. In the last line we use rule (Cons). To show
implication (I9), we apply the result of Example 4.10.
Then we apply rule (If). Implication (I8) follows from Axiom (A1). To show implication (I7), we apply the first result of
Example 4.9.
To derive implication (I6) we first note that from the definition of RBool we get RBool(v5) ⇒ P(v5) = 12 ∧ P(¬v5) =
1
2 ⇒ P(true) = 1. We then check the probability of v5 = b:
P(v5 = b) = P((v5 ∧ b) ∨ (¬v5 ∧ ¬b)) = P((v5 ∧ b))+ P(¬v5 ∧ ¬b)− 0
[I(v5, b)] = P(v5) · P(b)+ P(¬v5) · P(¬b)
[R(v5)] = 12 · P(b)+ 12 · P(¬b) = 12 · (P(b)+ P(¬b)) = 12 · P(b ∨ ¬b)
= 12 · P(true) = 12 · 1 = 12 .
As the next step we use rule (Assign). Implication (I5) follows from Lemma 5.2. For implication (I4) noting that – using
short-hand ρ = 1/(q3 · r · 2) – we have
(¬v5)?RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, tmp, v4, v5)
[(A11)] ⇒ P(v5 = true) = 0
[(A4)] ⇒ P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, tmp = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = true) = 0
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(v5)?RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, tmp, v4, v5)
[Def. R] ⇒ (v5)?(P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, tmp = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = true) = ρ)
[ex. 4.9(ii)] ⇒ P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, tmp = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = true) = ρ.
Combining these two facts by using the congruence lemma for+ and then applying the result in Example 4.10 give
p1 + p2 ⇒ P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, tmp = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = true) = 0+ ρ = ρ.
Symmetrically we also get
p1 + p2 ⇒ P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, tmp = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = false) = ρ + 0 = ρ.
Thus
p1 + p2 ⇒ ∀i5 : P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, tmp = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = i5) = ρ.
For all introduction for the free variables i1, i2, i3, i4, this gives us implication (I4).
The following steps are straightforward from rules (If) and (Assign). Implications (I2) and (I3) are trivial.
Finally for implication (I1) we use the assumption that multiplication · has an inverse in the group. We use this
assumption in the form of the following two properties:
∀k, l : ∃m : k ·m = l (Mul I)
∀k, l,m : (k ·m = l ·m) → k = l. (Mul II)
Using these assumptions we derive implication (I1) as follows (again using ρ as a short-hand for 1/(q3 · r · 2))
RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)
⇒ ∀j : P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, v3 = j, v4 = i4, v5 = i5) = ρ
[Mul I] ⇒ ∀i3 : ∃j : j · f (i1, i4) = i3 ∧
P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, v3 = j, v4 = i4, v5 = i5) = ρ
[Mul II] ⇒ ∀i3 : ∃j : (v3 = j↔ v3 · f (i1, i4) = i3) ∧
P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, v3 = j, v4 = i4, v5 = i5) = ρ
[ex. 4.7(i)] ⇒ ∀i3 : ∃j : P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, v3 · f (i1, i4) = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = i5) = ρ
⇒ ∀i3 : P(v1 = i1, v2 = i2, v3 · f (v1, v4) = i3, v4 = i4, v5 = i5) = ρ
⇒ RZ∗q 3,RND,Bool(v1, v2, v3 · f (v1, v4), v4, v5).
This completes the correctness proof of the triple describing the basic game. Combining this with (syntactic)
transformations gives a proof of ElGamal security which can be mechanically checked.
6. Conclusions and future work
In this paperwe take an important step towardmechanizing the proofs in themethodology introduced in [5] by providing
a calculus for reasoning about the validity of implication between probabilistic predicates. The usefulness of the calculus
from this perspective is illustrated by showing how it can be used to replace the partly semantical reasoning of [5] in the
main Hoare style derivation for the ElGamal correctness proof.
The calculus combines a black box interpretation allowing classical logical reasoning, a congruence result and a list
of axioms capturing the basic behaviour and distributivity properties of the arithmetical operators. The next step in the
mechanization is the implementation of probabilistic predicates in a theorem proving system, such as PVS, HOL, etc. We
envision three possible levels of abstraction: The first, most abstract, level is an implementation of the calculus. There is
no notion of probabilistic state and reasoning consisting of application of the calculus rules and use of the proof checker’s
built inmechanisms for reasoning about deterministic predicates. The second level introduces probabilistic states in terms of
abstract functions andprobabilistic properties of these functions as axioms. This allowsmodeling the semantics of predicates
and deriving results directly from the probabilistic properties and showing the correctness of the calculus rules themselves.
The final level defines probabilistic states as countable sums and uses arithmetical properties of such sums to derive results.
In this waywe can derive results directly fromproperties of the data types (such as real numbers). Of course, one canmix the
levels as needed; e.g. results in a lower level can be added as axioms in a higher level. In this waywe can justify results based
on elemental propertieswhile still reasoning about programs at a high level of abstraction. In addition to the implementation
of probabilistic predicates in a proof checker there is the step to Hoare logic proof outlines. Checking correct application of
the Hoare logic rules can be implemented in the proof checker or could be done by a pre-processor which does syntactic
checks and outputs proof obligations in the form of implications to be checked in your favorite (probabilistic predicate
enabled) proof checker.
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We have not addressed issues such as completeness, decidability and the ability to automatically derive proofs. In the
target application area we typically already have the proofs but need an intuitive way of formally expressing the properties
and proofs and check them for oversights. Thus we focus on expressiveness andminimizing the step from the existing proof
to formalization. The framework [12] provides a well developed quantitative weakest precondition approach which allows
calculating expectations. However, translating existing proofs to this setting seems to require more adaption and/or the use
of meta-logical statements in the formulation of the cryptographic properties and algorithms. With reasonable restrictions
it is also possible to define weakest preconditions and obtain a complete and decidable reasoning system in the probabilistic
Hoare logic setting [4]. Though the size of these predicates may quickly become unmanageable for our purpose, it may be
possible to use similar techniques to build decidable and complete lower levels. Having a decidable, complete logic at this
lowest level makes decidability and completeness at the higher levels less of an issue.
Besides mechanization, of key importance is validating the framework by extending it to deal with different classes of
cryptographic algorithms and different types of security properties. Examples and related work are provided in [5]. Much
more complicated transformations are needed than those used in the ElGamal correctness proof which will undoubtedly
require additional means to establish equivalence of games.
Appendix. Soundness of the calculus
To be able to reason about the soundness of the calculuswe formalize the distinction betweenderivable using the calculus
and semantical validity. We write |H p ≡ q if the equivalence is semantically valid (Definition 4.1). We say an equivalence
is derivable, denoted ` p ≡ q, when it can be obtained by a finite number of applications of the following rules:
BB(p)↔ BB(q) p ≡ q p ≡ q′ q′ ≡ q p ≡ q
(An) p ≡ q p ≡ p q ≡ p p ≡ q C(q) ≡ C(p)
where (An) is one of the axioms introduced in Section 4, BB(p) is a black box interpretation of p as introduced inDefinition 4.3
with↔ equivalence of deterministic predicates (for which we assume some sound reasoning system is used) and C is a
context. The rules are the axioms, a ‘black box’ rule and the standard equational rules (reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity
and context).
Theorem A.1. The calculus is sound, i.e. ` p ≡ q implies |H p ≡ q.
Proof. Soundess is shown by induction on the number of applications of the rules in the derivation. The induction step is
clear for the standard equational rules and the back box rule fromDefinition 4.1, Lemmas 4.2 and 4.4. This leaves only validity
of the axioms to be shown. The next section illustrates how these are shown valid by treating representative cases. 
A.1. Validity of the axioms
In this section we illustrate how the validity of the axioms can be derived by treating some of the key axioms. We treat
a basic probabilistic axiom and the characterizations of the different operators. First we fix some notation:
Definition A.2. We use f [S] to denote the sum of f over all elements specified by S:
• For f a function to the non-negative reals and S a f -countable1 subset of its domain: f [S] :=∑s∈S f (s)• For a probabilistic state θ and a deterministic predicate dpwe define
θ [dp] := θ [{ σ | σ |H dp }].
• For the special case dp = truewe write |θ |, called the probability mass of θ :
|θ | := θ [true].
To show correctness of axiom (A3) we first note that f [S ∪ S ′] = f [S] + f [S ′] − f [S ∩ S ′]. Using this fact we get:
|H (A3) P(dp ∨ dp′) = P(dp)+ P(dp′)− P(dp ∧ dp′) ≡ true.
Proof. [⇒] Clear.
[⇐] If θ |H true then
θ [dp ∨ dp′] = θ [{ σ | σ |H dp } ∪ { σ | σ |H dp′ }]
= θ [{ σ | σ |H dp }] + θ [{ σ | σ |H dp′ }] − θ [{ σ | σ |H dp } ∩ { σ | σ |H dp′ }]
= θ [dp] + θ [dp′] − θ [dp ∧ dp′]
thus θ |H P(dp ∨ dp′) = P(dp)+ P(dp′)− P(dp ∧ dp′). 
1 f is non-zero on at most countably many elements of S.
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To show correctness of axiom (A5) we first note that ρ · (θ [S]) = (ρ · θ)[S] and ρ · θ is a state if ρ · |θ | ≤ 1. Using these
facts we get:
|H (A5) ρ · (P(dp) = r) ≡ P(dp) = ρ · r ∧ P(true) ≤ ρ.
Proof. [⇒] If θ |H ρ · (P(dp) = r) then θ = ρ · θ ′, θ ′ |H P(dp) = r for some θ ′ ∈ Θ .
Thus θ [dp] = ρ · θ ′[dp] = ρ · I(r) and θ [true] = θ [S] = ρ · θ ′[S] ≤ ρ · 1 = ρ.
Thus θ |H P(dp) = ρ · r and θ |H P(true) ≤ ρ.
[⇐] If θ |H P(dp) = ρ · r ∧ P(true) ≤ ρ then |θ | ≤ ρ thus θ ′ := 1
ρ
· θ is a state inΘ .
We have θ = ρ · θ ′ and θ ′ |H P(dp) = r. Thus θ |H ρ · (P(dp) = r). 
To show correctness of axiom (A11) we first note that θ = c?θ +¬c?θ . Using this fact we get:
|H (A11) c?(P(dp) = r) ≡ P(¬c) = 0 ∧ ∃rδ : P(dp) = r− rδ ∧ 0 ≤ rδ ≤ 1− P(true) ∧ (dp→ c)→ rδ = 0.
Proof. [⇒] If θ |H c?(P(dp) = r) then θ = c?θ ′, θ ′ |H P(dp) = r for some θ ′ ∈ Θ . Thus θ [¬c] = c?θ ′[¬c] = 0
as c?θ ′(σ ) = 0 when σ 6|H c. Put θ ′′ := ¬c?θ ′ then θ ′ = θ + θ ′′, i.e. θ = θ ′ − θ ′′. Also, put I(rδ) := θ ′′[dp], then
θ [dp] = θ ′[dp] − θ ′′[dp] = I(r)− I(rδ) and I(rδ) ≥ 0 and I(rδ) = θ ′′[dp] ≤ θ ′′[S] = θ ′[S] − θ [S] ≤ 1− θ [S]. Finally, if
(dp→ c), then I(rδ) = θ ′′[dp] ≤ θ ′′[c] = 0.
[⇐] If θ |H P(¬c) = 0 ∧ ∃rδ : P(dp) = r − rδ ∧ 0 ≤ rδ ≤ 1 − P(true) ∧ (dp → c) → rδ = 0 then θ = c?θ as
θ ′[¬c] = 0.
If (dp → c), then put θ ′ := θ . We have θ = c?θ ′ and θ ′[dp] = I(r) − I(rδ) = I(r) − 0 = I(r). Thus θ = c?θ ′,
θ ′ |H P(dp) = r.
Otherwise there exists σ : σ |H dp, σ 6|H c. Put θ ′ := θ + I(rδ) · σ , then c?θ ′ = θ and θ ′[dp] = θ [dp] + I(rδ) =
(I(r)− I(rδ))+ I(rδ) = I(r). Thus again θ = c?θ ′, θ ′ |H P(dp) = r. 
Finally, to show correctness of axiom (A22) we let the operation ? work on deterministic predicates and states rather than
only on conditions and states: We have that dp?θ(σ ) equals θ(σ ) if σ |H dp and 0 otherwise. Using this notation we get:
|H (A22) P(dp) = r+ P(dp′) = r’ ≡ r ≤ P(dp) ∧ r’ ≤ P(dp′) ∧ P(dp ∧ dp′) ≤ r+ r’ ≤ P(dp ∨ dp′)
Proof. [⇒] If θ |H P(dp) = r+ P(dp′) = r’, then θ = θ1 + θ2, θ1 |H P(dp) = r, θ2 |H P(dp) = r’ for some θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ .
Thus θ [dp] ≥ θ1[dp] = I(r), i.e. θ |H r ≤ P(dp), also θ [dp′] ≥ θ2[dp′] = I(r’), i.e. θ |H r’ ≤ P(dp′). Finally,
θ [dp ∧ dp′] = θ1[dp ∧ dp′] + θ2[dp ∧ dp′] ≤ θ1[dp] + θ2[dp′]
θ1[dp] + θ2[dp′] ≤ θ1[dp ∨ dp′] + θ2[dp ∨ dp′] = θ [dp ∨ dp′]
thus θ |H P(dp ∧ dp′) ≤ r+ r’ ≤ P(dp ∨ dp′).
[⇐] If θ |H r ≤ P(dp) ∧ r’ ≤ P(dp′) ∧ P(dp ∧ dp′) ≤ r + r’ ≤ P(dp ∨ dp′) then we split θ into θ1 + θ2 such that
θ1 |H P(dp) = r and θ2 |H P(dp′) = r’. To be able to do this we divide θ into four parts depending on whether dp and/or
dp′ are satisfied:
θnn := (¬dp ∧ ¬dp′)?θ θny := (¬dp ∧ dp′)?θ
θyn := (dp ∧ ¬dp′)?θ θyy := (dp ∧ dp′)?θ.
Note that the value ofP(dp) in θ equals |θyn|+ |θyy|. For each of these parts we determine howmuch they should contribute
to θ1 and θ2. As θnn does not effect the probability of dp nor that of dp′ it can go anywhere. Belowwe will put it in θ1. We call
the contribution of the other three sections to θ1 α, β and γ respectively and the contributions to θ2 α¯, β¯ and γ¯ respectively.
γ := min{ |θyy|, I(r), |θyy| − (I(r’)− |θny|) } γ¯ := |θyy| − γ
β := I(r)− γ β¯ := |θyn| − β
α := |θny| − α¯ α¯ := I(r’)− γ¯
θ1 := θnn + (α/|θny|) · θny θ2 := (α¯/|θny|) · θny + (β¯/|θyn|)
+(β/|θyn|) · θyn + (γ /|θyy|) · θyy ·θyn + (γ¯ /|θyy|) · θyy
Note that the coefficient of θny has been chosen to get the contribution to the mass of θ1 equal to α(= | (α/|θny|) · θny |) (and
similarly for the other coefficients).
As θ1+ θ2 must equal θ we have that α+ α¯ = |θny|, and similarly for β and γ . Also, because the probability of dp should
be I(r) in θ1 we have that β + γ = I(r) (as θnn and θny do not contribute to the probability of dp) and similarly, because
θ2 should give probability I(r’) to dp′ we have α¯ + γ¯ = I(r’). Looking at these restrictions we see that fixing γ fixes all
parameters. Above we have chosen to make γ as large as possible. There are three factors restricting the choice of γ : (1) We
cannot put more than there is (γ ≤ |θyy|). (2) The value of P(dp)must not exceed I(r), so certainly γ ≤ I(r), (3) The value
of P(dp′) must be I(r’) in θ2. As this probability can only come from θyn and θyy we need that γ¯ is at least I(r’) − |θyn|,
i.e. γ ≤ |θyy| − (I(r’)− |θny|).
To show that θ1 and θ2 are well defined states it is sufficient to show that γ , γ¯ , β, β¯, α and α¯ are not negative.
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– (γ ≥ 0) Clearly |θyy| ≥ 0 and I(r) ≥ 0. Also, as θ |H P(dp′) ≥ r’, I(r’) ≤ θ [dp′] = |θny| + |θyy|, thus
|θyy| − (I(r’)− |θny|) ≥ 0.
– (γ¯ ≥ 0) As γ ≤ |θyy|we have γ¯ ≥ 0.
– (β ≥ 0) As γ ≤ I(r)we have I(r)− γ ≥ 0.
– (β¯ ≥ 0) We have β¯ = |θyn| − I(r) + γ . If γ = |θyy|, then β¯ = |θyn| + |θyy| − I(r) ≥ 0 as P(dp) ≥ r. If γ = I(r), then
β¯ = |θyn| ≥ 0. If γ = |θyy|− (I(r’)−|θny|), then β¯ = |θyn|+ |θyy|+ |θny|− (I(r)+ I(r’)) ≥ 0 as P(dp ∨ dp′) ≥ r+r’.
– (α ≥ 0) We have α = |θny| − (I(r’)− (|θyy| − γ )) ≥ |θny| − (I(r’)− (|θyy| − (|θyy| − (I(r’)− |θny)))) = 0.
– (α¯ ≥ 0) We have α¯ = I(r’)− |θyy| + γ . If γ = |θyy|, then α¯ = I(r’) ≥ 0. If γ = I(r), then α¯ = I(r)+ I(r’)− |θyy|> 0
as r+ r’ ≥ P(dp ∧ dp′). If γ = |θyy| − (I(r’)− |θny|), then α¯ = |θny| ≥ 0.
By construction θ1 + θ2 = θ , θ1 |H P(dp) = r and θ2 |H P(dp′) = r’. Thus θ |H P(dp) = r+ P(dp′) = r’. 
This completes themost involved proofs for the axioms. Correctness of the other axioms can be shown in a similar or simpler
fashion.
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